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One of the most difficult problems encountered by a criminal defense
attorney is a client's desire to present perjured alibi testimony at trial.2
When a client insists on presenting perjured testimony, counsel is faced with
the frequently conflicting requirements of the Code of Professional Respon-
sibility,3 the constitutional right to effective assistance of counsel, and the
1. 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981).
2. In Maddox v. State, 613 S.W.2d 275 (Tex. Grim. App. 1980), the court
stated:
The problem of representing a defendant who insists on. . . [presenting
false testimony] has been called, correctly, one of the hardest questions a
criminal defense lawyer faces. The attorney is faced simultaneously with a
duty to represent his client effectively,. . . a duty not to disclose the confi-
dential communications of his client, a duty to reveal fraud on the court,
and a duty not to knowingly use perjured testimony (as well as the possi-
bility of criminal liability for perjury). The difficulty is increased by the
defendant's right to put the prosecution to its burden of overcoming the
presumption of innocence by proof beyond a reasonable doubt. "In prac-
tice, . . . the duties have come to be in perhaps uncontrollable conflict."
Id at 280 (quoting G. HAZARD, ETHICS IN THE PRACTICE OF LAw 129 (1978)).
This Note will focus on the dilemma faced by counsel when he knows in advance
that his client intends to present perjured witness testimony. It does not address the
problems raised when a client intends to commit perjury himself. See Lowery v.
Cardwell, 575 F.2d 727, 730 (9th Cir. 1978); Allen v. State, 518 S.W.2d 170, 172
(Mo. App., St. L. 1974); Freedman, Professional Responsibiliy of the Criminal Defense
Lawyer. The Three Hardest Questions, 64 MICH. L. REV. 1469 (1966); Comment, The
Failure of Situation-Oriented Professional Rules to Guide Conduct: Conficting Responsibilities
of the Criminal Defense Attorney Whose Client Commits or Intends to Commit Perjuey, 55
WASH. L. REv. 211 (1979); Comment, The Perjue Dilemma in an Adversavy System, 82
DICK. L. REv. 545 (1978); Annot., 64 A.L.R.3d 385. This Note also will not discuss
the attorney's duties after a client or witness has committed unanticipated perjury
or fraud. See Brazil, Unanticipated Client Perjugr and the Collision of Rules of Ethics, Evi-
dence, and Constitutional Law, 44 Mo. L. REv. 601 (1979); Wolfram, Client Perjur, 50
S. CAL. L. REV. 809 (1977). See also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBIL-
iTy DR 7-102(B)(1), (B)(2) (1979).
3. "A lawyer should represent a client zealously within the bounds of the
law." MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979). "A law-
yer should preserve the confidences and secrets of a client." Id. Canon 4. The
Code also provides that "a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . [u]se a confidence or
secret of his client to the disadvantage of the client." Id DR 4-101 (B) (2). But a
1
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attorney-client privilege.4 In People v. Schultheis,5 the Colorado Supreme
Court developed an approach to the problem that, while not alleviating the
conflict, realistically balances the attorney's duties to his client6 and to the
court.
7
Glen Schultheis was charged with the murder of a fellow inmate while
incarcerated in the Denver County Jail. He first pleaded not guilty by rea-
son of insanity but later entered a plea of not guilty after psychiatric exami-
nation. On the morning of his trial, Schultheis objected to the proceeding
on the ground that his court-appointed attorney was inadequate and unpre-
pared. He asserted that his attorney had refused to subpoena two alibi
witnesses. In the presence of the trial judge, defense counsel explained that
he refused to affirmatively present evidence he knew to be fabricated. He
moved to withdraw on the ground of irreconcilable differences, but the mo-
tion was denied.' Schultheis and his counsel made a record, out of the pres-
ence of the trial judge, which showed that counsel believed he had an
ethical duty to refrain from calling the two witnesses who would claim
Schultheis had been with them at the time of the murder.' Counsel contin-
ued to represent Schultheis at the trial. The alibi witnesses were not called,
lawyer may reveal "[t]he intention of his client to commit a crime and the informa-
tion necessary to prevent the crime." Id DR 4-101(C)(3).
4. The attorney-client evidentiary privilege generally states that "[a]n . .. at-
torney may not divulge to others confidential communications, information, and
secrets imparted to him by the client or acquired during their professional relation,
unless he is authorized to do so by the client himself." 7 AM. JUR. 2D AUVomrn at
Law § 120 (1980). The attorney-client privilege is more limited than the lawyer's
ethical obligation "to guard the confidences and secrets of his client." MODEL
CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 4-4 (1979). The lawyer is also ex-
pected to act in a manner that preserves the privilege. Id
5. 638 P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981).
6. The basic duty of the lawyer for the accused "is to serve as the accused's
counselor and advocate with courage, devotion, and to the utmost of his or her
learning and ability and according to the law." STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUS-
TIcE § 4-1.1(b) (2d ed. 1980).
7. In State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970), the court stated:
The high ethical standards demanded of counsel in no way mollify the
fair, full and loyal representation to which an accused is entitled as a part
of due process. They are entirely consistent with the objective of our legal
system-to ascertain an accused's guilt or innocence in accordance with
the established rules of evidence and procedure designed to develop the
facts truthfully and fairly. Counsel, of course, must protect the interests of
his client and defend with all his skill and energy, but he must do so in an
ethical manner.
Id at 236, 468 P.2d at 141.
8. 638 P.2d at 10.
9. Id Counsel based his belief that the witnesses' testimony would be
fabricated on his own conversations with the defendant and on the defendant's con-
versations with the examining psychiatrists. Id at 11.
[Vol. 48
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and Schultheis was convicted of first degree murder."
The Colorado Court of Appeals reversed the trial court's decision and
remanded the case, holding that a lawyer has an affirmative duty to with-
draw from a case in which his client is intent on presenting perjured witness
testimony, and that under such circumstances the court must grant the mo-
tion to withdraw. To do otherwise, the court held, is a denial of constitu-
tionally required effective assistance of counsel.' The Colorado Supreme
Court, in turn, reversed, 2 holding that the defendant's right to effective
assistance of counsel was not violated by counsel's refusal to present per-
jured witness testimony and the denial of the motion to withdraw."1 The
supreme court set forth a four-part approach to guide defense attorneys
faced with similar conflicts. First, a lawyer cannot offer testimony of a wit-
ness that he knows is false, fraudulent, or perjured. 4 Second, when counsel
cannot dissuade his client from insisting that the fabricated testimony be
presented, counsel should request permission to withdraw.15 Third, counsel
should not reveal to the trial judge the specific facts or the specific Code
provisions behind his motion to withdraw. 6 Fourth, if the motion to with-
draw is denied, counsel must continue to defend his client so as not to de-
prive him of effective assistance of counsel.'
The first part of the Schultheis approach restates the traditional rule
that, although the lawyer owes his client the duties of zealous advocacy
8
and confidentiality,' 9 he has a professional duty not to perpetrate a fraud
on the court by knowingly presenting perjured testimony or other false evi-
dence.20 As an officer of the court, a lawyer's duty to the court is commen-
10. Id at 10.
11. People v. Schultheis, 618 P.2d 710, 714-15 (Colo. Ct. App. 1980), rev'd, 638
P.2d 8 (Colo. 1981). The court of appeals reasoned that by continuing his represen-
tation of the defendant after the disagreement as to the presentation of the alibi
testimony, defense counsel departed from his role as an advocate and became, in
effect, an amicus curiae. Id See State v. Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 195, 368
N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (1977) ("denial of a substantial portion of defense counsel's func-
tion is as much a violation of constitutional rights to counsel as the total denial of
all assistance of counsel').
12. 638 P.2d at 15.
13. Id at 12.
14. Id at 11.
15. Id at 13.
16. Id
17. Id
18. See MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7 (1979).
19. See id Canon 4; Mo. REv. STAT. § 491.060 (1978).
20. See People v. Pike, 58 Cal. 2d 70, 97, 372 P.2d 656, 672, 22 Cal. Rptr. 664,
680 (1962); People v. Radinsky, 176 Colo. 357, 360, 490 P.2d 951, 953 (1971); Her-
bert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975); State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App.
535, 541-42, 429 A.2d 244, 247-48 (1981); Allen v. State, 518 S.W.2d 170, 172 (Mo.
App., St. L. 1974); In re King, 7 Utah 2d 258, 262, 322 P.2d 1095, 1097 (1958). See
1983]
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surate with his duty to represent the accused.21 Perjury is also a criminal
offense,22 and the lawyer who knowingly introduces perjured testimony
could be prosecuted for subornation of perjury and obstruction of justice.23
An attorney should present any admissible evidence unless he knows it
to be fabricated.24 A lawyer's belief that his client intends to present false
testimony should not be based on a mere inconsistency in the client's story,
but rather on "an independent investigation of the evidence or upon dis-
tinct statements by his client or the witness which support that belief."25
Defense counsel should not dictate "what is true and what is not unless
there is compelling support for his conclusion." 26 An important question-
also MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR l-102(A)(4), DR 7-
102(A) (4), (6), (7); STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE § 4-7.5(a) (2d ed. 1980).
21. See Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975). One commen-
tator has noted:
The tension between the defense lawyer's role as an officer of the court
and his duty to act as a zealous advocate and representative of his accused
client creates the lawyer's dilemma. Any solution to this dilemma which
fails to protect the integrity of the truth-finding function of the adversary
system of justice is inadequate.
Erickson, The Perjurious Defendant: A Proposed Solution to the Defnse Lawyer's Conflicting
Ethical Obligations to the Court and to His Client, 59 DEN. L.J. 75, 77 (1981). But see
Comment, The Perjugy Dilemma in an Adversagr System, 82 DICK. L. REv. 545, 547
(1978) ("it is ...[the attorney's] primary responsibility to champion his client's
cause by presenting the facts in a light most favorable to his client").
22. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 1621 (1976); COLO. REV. STAT. § 18-8-502 (1973);
Mo. REV. STAT. § 575.040 (1978).
23. Herbert v. United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975) (citing Gregory v.
United States, 369 F.2d 185, 188 (D.C. Cir. 1966)).
24. "A lawyer should. . . present any admissible evidence his client desires to
have presented unless he knows, or from facts within his knowledge should know,
that such testimony is false, fraudulent, or perjured." MODEL CODE OF PROFES-
SIONAL RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-26 (1979). See also State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super.
6, 16-17, 270 A.2d 284, 289 (1970).
25. 638 P.2d at 11.
26. State v. Lloyd, 48 Md. App. 535, 542, 429 A.2d 244, 248 (1981) (citing
State v. Whiteside, 272 N.W.2d 468, 469 (Iowa 1978)). In United States ex rel
Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), the court stated:
If an attorney faced with this situation were in fact to discuss with the
Trial Judge his belief that his client intended to perjure himself, without
possessing a firm factual basis for that belief, he would be violating the
duty imposed upon him as defense counsel. While defense counsel in a
criminal case assumes a dual role as a "zealous advocate" and as an "of-
ficer of the court," neither role would countenance disclosure to the Court
of counsel's private conjectures about the guilt or innocence of his client.
It is the role of the judge or jury to determine the facts, not that of the
attorney.
Id at 122. One commentator notes:
[B]ecause of the unique character of the relationship between attorney
[Vol. 48
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unanswered by Schultheisr-is whether an attorney has a duty to investigate
the truthfulness of testimony. Generally, it has been held that no such duty
exists.2 7
When counsel cannot dissuade his client from insisting that perjured
testimony be presented, he should seek to withdraw from the case.
28
Schultheis makes it clear, however, that the lawyer's duty to seek withdrawal
does not arise when he first learns of his client's intention to present false
testimony but only when a serious disagreement arises as to the presentation
of the testimony.29 Other courts have required an attorney to withdraw
upon learning of the intended perjury.30 North Carolina has imposed an
affirmative duty to withdraw when "an attorney learns, prior to trial, that
his client intends to commit perjury or participate in the perpetration of a
fraud upon the court,"'" and failure to withdraw warrants censure. The
Schultheis court points out that mandatory withdrawal is not always practi-
cal b~cause the disagreement with the client may not take place until the
and client, a strong argument can be made that the level of certainty of
wrongdoing an advocate should reach before revealing the client's alleged
wrongs is even higher than the level of certainty required of the trier of
fact in a criminal proceeding. . . .Unlike the trier of fact, the attorney is
charged with a unique form of loyalty to his client and a special relation-
ship to earn and maintain his client's trust . . . The relationship be-
tween client and attorney that our system promotes is thus more than
fiduciary; it also involves an acutely personal form of dependence. Great
violence would be done to that relationship and the values it reflects if
clients could not be confident that their lawyers would not turn against
them unless their wrongdoings were completely indisputable.
Brazil, supra note 2, at 609.
27. Brazil, supra note 2, at 610. See State v. Zwillman, 112 N.J. Super. 6, 16,
270 A.2d 284, 289 (1970). But see Wolfram, supra note 2, at 843 ("The attorney
should not be able to evade the responsibility of correcting false testimony by will-
fully remaining ignorant where known facts call for further investigation").
28. 638 P.2d at 13.
29. Id In State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 224 S.E.2d 174 (1976), the court
stated:
A mere disagreement between the defendant and his court-appointed
counsel as to trial tactics is not sufficient to require the trial court to re-
place court-appointed counsel with another attorney. Trial counsel,
whether court-appointed or privately employed, is not the mere lackey or
"mouthpiece" of his client. He is in charge of and has the responsibility
for the conduct of the trial, including the selection of witnesses to be called
to the stand on behalf of his client and the interrogation of them.
Id at 66, 224 S.E.2d at 179.
30. See In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 650, 252 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979); State v.
Trapp, 52 Ohio App. 2d 189, 194, 368 N.E.2d 1278, 1282 (1977).
31. In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 650, 252 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979) (attorney cen-
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time of trial and new counsel may not be immediately available without
continuing the trial date. 2 In addition, the Schultheis court reasoned that
"if each successive lawyer was faced with an ethical disagreement with the
accused, mandatory withdrawal would always allow the defendant an un-
limited number of continuances. This situation could ultimately result in a
perpetual cycle of eleventh-hour motions to withdraw.
'33
When making his motion to withdraw, defense counsel should never be
required to cite the specific provisions of the Code that prohibit the use of
perjured testimony or false evidence.3 4 Instead, counsel may only state that
he has an irreconcilable conflict with his client.3 5 The court reasoned that
defense counsel should not "be required to divulge a privileged communica-
tion to the trial court during trial."31 6 This part of the Schulthei approach is
narrower than the Code's directives. While DR 4-101(B)(2) states that "a
lawyer shall not knowingly use a confidence or secret of his client to the
disadvantage of the client,"3 7 DR 4-101(C) (3) states that "a lawyer may
reveal the intention of his client to commit a crime and the information
necessary to prevent the crime."3' Although the Code provides that a law-
yer may reveal his client's intentions, it does not dictate revelation. 9 The
Schultheis decision is in direct opposition to the Kansas Supreme Court's
32. 638 P.2d at 14.
33. Id The court also noted:
If the trial court was required to grant every motion to withdraw, new
counsel might fail to recognize the problem of fabricated testimony for
alibi witnesses, and false evidence would be presented to the court. Or,
counsel may view his ethical obligation as requiring neither a withdrawal
nor any indication that the problem of potential false evidence exists. We
cannot sanction either result, for in both cases, fraud is committed upon
the court.
Id at 14-15.
34. Id at 13.
35. Id at 14. The court said that "although no record of the disagreement is
required for the trial judge, counsel should proceed with a request for a record out
of the presence of the trial judge and the prosecutor if the court denies the motion to
withdraw." Id This prohibition against disclosing reasons for withdrawal has re-
ceived some criticism:
[S]ince the defense lawyer is prohibited from disclosing his reasons for
withdrawal, denial of the motion is inevitable. Inquiry by the court into
the lawyer's motives for withdrawal forces the lawyer either to disregard
his confidential relationship with his client or to stand mute. In either
event, the court will conclude that the defendant intends to commit per-
jury and, therefore, will consider the defendant's conduct an obstruction
of justice.
Erickson, supra note 21, at 83.
36. 638 P.2d at 13.
37. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBnILIv DR 4-101(B)(2) (1979),
38. Id DR 4-101(C)(3).
39. Erickson, supra note 21, at 80.
[Vol. 48
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decision in State v. Henderson:40
We perceive nothing violative of the confidentiality inherent in
the attorney-client relation by [the attorney] making known to the
court the defendant's avowed intention of presenting perjured tes-
timony. While as a general rule counsel is not allowed to disclose
information imparted to him by his client or acquired during their
professional relation, unless authorized to do so by the client him-
self, the announced intention of a client to commit perjury, or any
other crime, is not included within the confidences which an attor-
ney is bound to respect.4 1
Henderson seems to disregard the extreme prejudice that can result from in-
forming a judge of the client's intention to present perjured testimony since
that judge may later hear the case and sentence the defendant. As the
Schultheis court stated, "Even when counsel makes a motion to withdraw,
the defendant is always entitled to an impartial trial judge, untainted by
accusations that the defendant had insisted upon presenting fabricated
testimony.'
4 2
If the motion to withdraw is denied, counsel should continue to repre-
sent the client without presenting the perjured testimony; such representa-
tion does not deprive the client of effective assistance of counsel.4 3 The
constitution guarantees that "[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused
shall enjoy the right. . . to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." 44
This has been interpreted to mean the right to ej7fctive assistance of coun-
sel.45 Effective assistance "contemplates the guidance of a responsible, ca-
pable lawyer devoted to his client's interests."" Courts are given widediscretion in determining what constitutes ineffective assistance of coun-
40. 205 Kan. 231, 468 P.2d 136 (1970). In Henderson, the defendant informed
counsel of his intention to present perjured testimony. Counsel conveyed this inten-
tion to the judge in support of his motion to withdraw. The motion was denied,
and counsel continued to represent the defendant. The court held that denial of the
motion was not an abuse of discretion. Id at 239, 468 P.2d at 143.
41. Id at 237, 468 P.2d at 141. In United States ex re. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555
F.2d 115 (3d Cir. 1977), the court said, "It is essential to our adversary system that a
client's ability to communicate freely and in confidence with his counsel be main-
tained inviolate. When an attorney unnecessarily discloses the confidences of his
client, he creates a chilling effect which inhibits the mutual trust and independence
necessary to effective representation." Id at 122.
42. 638 P.2d at 13.
43. Id
44. U.S. CONsT. amend. VI. This right was made applicable to the states in
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 339 (1963).
45. The sixth amendment was so construed in Glasser v. United States, 315
U.S: 60, 76 (1942), where the court appraised "the quality of the defense" to deter-
mine that representation was ineffective. See also White v. Ragen, 324 U.S. 760, 764
(1945).
46. State v. Henderson, 205 Kan. 231, 237, 468 P.2d 136, 141 (1970).
1983]
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sel.47 They are extremely reluctant to second-guess an attorney's conduct at
trial and usually dismiss claims of ineffective assistance at trial unless there
is no reasonable basis for the attorney's acts.4" The decision to call or not
call certain witnesses is a matter of trial tactics to be determined by defense
counsel.4 9 A defendant cannot compel defense counsel to present witnesses
whose testimony is fabricated,5" and counsel's refusal to present the testi-
mony does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel. 5 ' It is axiomatic
that a client's right to effective assistance of ounsel does not include the
right to compel counsel to knowingly participate in the commission of per-
jury or the presentation of false evidence.52
The Code provides general standards for attorneys faced with the per-
jured testimony dilemma,5" but it fails to give an attorney direction when
his motion to withdraw, if made, is denied.5 4 Similarly, the proposed
Model Rules of Professional Conduct5 5 give no guidance to the attorney in
his continued representation of the client.5 6 Schultheis sets forth a step-by-
47. For an overview of the various standards in use today, see Gard, Ineffective
Assistance of Counse--Standard and Remedies, 41 MO. L. REV. 483, 493-99 (1976). See
also STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§ 4-3.6(a), 4-3.8, 4-4.1, 4-5.1 (2d ed.
1980).
48. See, e.g., Barba-Reyes v. United States, 387 F.2d 91, 93 (9th Cir. 1967);
Williams v. Beto, 354 F.2d 698, 703 (5th Cir. 1965).
49. State v. Robinson, 290 N.C. 56, 66, 224 S.E.2d 174, 179 (1976).
50. United States v. Gutterman, 147 F.2d 540, 542 (2d Cir. 1945).
51. 638 P.2d at 12 ("defendant's constitutional right. . . does not include the
right to require his lawyer to perpetrate a fraud on the court"). Accord Herbert v.
United States, 340 A.2d 802, 804 (D.C. 1975).
52. In re Palmer, 296 N.C. 638, 650, 252 S.E.2d 784, 791 (1979) (citing ABA
Comm. on Ethics and Professional Responsibility, Informal Op. 1314 (1975)).
53. MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY Canon 9; DR 1-
102(A)(1), (4); DR 2-110(C)(1)(c); DR 4-101(B)(2), (C)(3); DR 7-102(A)(4).
54. See Note, North Carolina's View of the Lawyer and the Perjtrious Witness, 55
N.C.L. REV. 321, 331 (1977) ("the Code is strangely silent on the subject of what
the lawyer should do if permission to withdraw is denied"').
55. (Proposed Final Draft 1981). The Model Rules were drafted by the ABA
Commission on Evaluation and Professional Standards and are intended to be a
comprehensive reformation of the current Model Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Introduction at 3 (Proposed Final
Draft 1981), reprinted in 67 A.B.A. J. 1299 (1981). At the time of this writing, the
Model Rules had not been adopted or approved by the ABA House of Delegates
and do not represent the policy of the ABA. See Stark, Review Essay, 12 CONN. L.
REV. 948 (1980) (reviewing MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (Proposed
Final Draft 1981)).
56. The Model Rules provide: "[A] lawyer may withdraw from representing a
client if withdrawal can be accomplished without material adverse effect on the
interests of the client, or if: (1) the client persists in a course of action involving the
lawyer's services that the lawyer reasonably believes is criminal or fraudulent."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.16(b) (Proposed Final Draft
[Vol. 48
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step approach that guides the attorney from the time he learns of his client's
intent to present perjured testimony until the disposition of the trial. This
approach is not only superior in the guidance it provides to attorneys, but
also in balancing the attorney's loyalties to the court and to his client.
JAMES C. MORROW
1981). If withdrawal is denied, the Model Rules only provide that "a lawyer shall
continue representation notwithstanding good cause for terminating the representa-
tion." Id Rule 1.16(c).
9
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